Abstract-Attacks on cyber-physical systems have recently increased in frequency, impact, and publicity. In this paper, a cyber-physical false data attack detection mechanism is proposed to protect the operation of power transmission and distribution systems by automatically inferring underlying physical relationships using cross-sensor analytics in order to detect sensor failures, replay attacks, and other data integrity issues in real-time. We investigate a neural network based mechanism acting on voltage and current readings resulting from a wide variety of load conditions on the IEEE 30-bus power system standard and compare its performance with a support vector machine based mechanism. Experiments showed that 99% detection accuracy of replay attacks was achieved using the proposed neural network mechanism. More importantly, we showed that the best approach was to not create physics-based features using what we knew about the system, but rather to use a neural network to automatically learn the laws, and then use the outputs of that to build a classifier to identify whether and where data spoofing occurs. Thus, it is preferable to infer and exploit the physics using a single machine learning solution rather than to add features first and then build a detector.
I. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure systems are of major importance to society, as they have a great impact on people's lives and the economy. Examples include the energy systems, telecommunication systems, and water supply. These cyberphysical systems are operated by means of computers and applications using two-way communication capabilities and distributed intelligence to enhance efficiency, reliability, and stability [1] . However, the stronger coupling between cyber and physical operations makes such systems more vulnerable to cyberattacks. Thus, these systems are susceptible to various cyber-physical attacks and, thus, need to be accompanied with appropriate security enforcements.
The electric grid has evolved over the past century from a series of small independent community-based systems to perhaps the largest and most complex cyber-physical system in the world. The increasing demand for reliable energy has motivated the development of a smart electric grid. The smart grid will expand the current capabilities of the grid's generation, transmission, and distribution systems to provide an infrastructure capable of handling future requirements for distributed generation, renewable energy sources, electric vehicles, and the demand-side management of electricity [2] . The increasing reliance on cyber-infrastructure to manage highly complex smart grids comes with the risk of cyberattacks by adversaries around the globe. For example, the hacking of Ukrainian electrical power utilities in 2015 caused a sustained loss of electricity to roughly 80,000 customers [3] . In addition, the cyber-attack on Pacific Gas & Electric's Metcalf substation in northern California caused more than $15 million in damage, [4] . Both of those attacks manipulated sensors to directly blind and disrupt the control centers.
The successful functioning of complex cyber-physical systems depends on the reliable operation of a control loop that takes sensor data as input and produces control decisions as output. While some attacks are essentially cyber attacks (e.g., hacking into a controller and re-routing power) or physical attacks (e.g., destroying physical equipment), all major attacks have also or exclusively manipulated the operator control loop to hide or to exacerbate the attack's impact [5] . The operator control loop is the feedback loop by which operators assess the situation and make decisions. By manipulating this loop, even if no physical damage is created directly, it is possible for attackers to indirectly create wide-ranging and devastating impacts, including brown-outs, surges, and black-outs. What all of these attacks have in common is that they compromise the integrity of the sensor data.
Additionally, sensors tend to be the least-protected components, often being accessible from cyber networks and difficult to harden or physically protect. Such sensors in smart grid context may include supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) sensors (bus voltage, line current, system frequency, real power, reactive power, etc.) [6] , phase measurement units (PMU) [7] , or smart meters for the advanced metering infrastructures (AMI) [8] . As sensors proliferate and many new low-cost sensors come online, there is a growing need for a method to establish trust in sensors so that operators may react to bad sensor data in real-time and avoid costly damages to the grid.
Current methods for detecting attacks on sensor data were created with a different purpose (i.e., system reliability) in mind and therefore are of minimal use in stopping cyberphysical attacks. These detection methods typically use out-ofbound alerts that look for sensors being unreasonably out of range [9] . These sorts of methods may detect extreme integrity attacks, but more nuanced integrity attacks can easily remain within range and avoid alerting the system. One particular type of attack, called a replay attack, spoofs the current sensor signals with signals that were recorded at an earlier time from the same sensor. As a result, they necessarily provide sensor readings that fall within the band and will not trigger an alert. A new, multi-sensor approach is required to more robustly detect integrity attacks across a wide range of operating conditions.
More advanced attack detection mechanisms against smart grids were introduced in [10] - [13] . These works show that by leveraging the knowledge of the power network topology, an advanced data-injection attack could bypass the bad data detection scheme in today's SCADA system. In particular, algorithms were proposed in [12] to place encrypted devices in the system to maximize the system security index level against such an attack. While in [13] , a computationally efficient algorithm was derived to detect and localize attacks using the generalized likelihood ratio test. A graph theoretic approach for detecting data integrity cyber attacks is presented in [14] that utilizes known-secure PMU as countermeasures against an arbitrary collection of cyberattacks. A deep learning-based approach for detecting data integrity cyber attacks is introduced in [15] , which considers time-varying network topologies via real-time data from PMUs and smart meters that facilitate the real-time security assessment of large-scale emerging energy systems. Lastly, the tradeoff between the detection speed and detection performance has been investigated in [16] .
Most of the works mentioned above do not take into consideration the physical laws of the electric grid and cannot be implemented in real-time. In a physical system, the sensors report on activities that are collectively constrained by immutable laws of physics. For example, current and voltage difference are proportionally related, with an often-unknown constant of proportionality depending on the resistance of the line. More complicated physical systems, including power grids, have more complex underlying laws. As more sensor readings are collected, more of the dependencies will become observable. Once the laws that rule sensors have been inferred, deviations from those laws indicate failures in data integrity.
In this paper, we propose a cyber-physical attack detection (CPAD) mechanism for false data that automatically infers underlying physical relationships using cross-sensor analytics to detect sensor failures, replay attacks, and other data integrity issues within smart grids in real-time. It focuses on inferring and exploiting the underlying physics of the system in order to quickly identify sensor measurements that, although they may appear reasonable in isolation, are implausible when viewed in a larger context. We investigate a neural network (NN) based mechanism acting on voltage and current readings resulting from a wide variety of load conditions on the IEEE 30-bus power grid test case. The support vector machine (SVM) based detection mechanism [17] is used as a baseline for comparison.
Experimental results showed that 99% detection accuracy of replay attacks was achieved using the proposed NN-based CPAD. More importantly, we showed that the best approach was to not create physics-based features using what we knew about the system, but rather to use a NN to automatically learn the laws, and then use the outputs of that to build a classifier to identify whether and where data spoofing occurs. Thus, it is preferable to infer and exploit the physics using a single machine learning solution rather than to add features first and then build a detector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes the IEEE 30-bus electric power system standard, which is used for testing our CPAD. Section III presents the detailed steps for CPAD that protects the operation of smart grids. It is based on NN-based machine learning approach. This section also presents the necessary steps required for generating the clean and spoofed datasets that are used for training and testing CPAD. Section IV presents experimental results that evaluate the accuracy of CPAD for a wide variety of load conditions on the IEEE 30-bus power grid test case. Our thoughts inferred from the experimental results will be discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI provides the conclusion and future work.
II. IEEE 30-BUS TEST CASE
The IEEE 30-bus power system standard illustrated in Fig.  1 is used in this paper as a test case for CPAD. It represents a portion of the American Electric Transmission Power System (in the Midwestern US). It consists of [18]  30 buses (substations)  41 branches (transmission lines (TLs)) divided as 9
TLs at 132kV, 18 TLs at 33kV, 2 TLs at 11 kV, and 1 TL at 1 kV.  Few transformers and synchronous condensers  6 generation buses (with total generated power of 300 MW and 150 MVAR)  20 load buses
The data provided in this standard is on 100 MVA base. The connections between sensors at the different buses (or nodes) and branches imply physics-based constraints. For example, current and voltage difference are proportionally related depending on the resistance of the line. Another example is that the total generated power should be equal to the total consumed power by the different loads plus the system losses. Additional local constraints include the current-sum relationship (Kirchhoff's current law (KCL)) and the voltagesum relationship (Kirchhoff's voltage law (KVL)). These constraints provide new ways to detect data spoofing as will be discussed in the next section. 
III. CYBER-PHYSICAL FALSE DATA ATTACK DETECTION MECHANISM
In this section, we present the CPAD mechanism that protects the operation of power transmission and distribution systems. CPAD directly addresses the problem of sensor trustworthiness by identifying readings across multiple sensors that indicate states that are not physically possible. Such states can be inferred by various machine learning approaches while considering the underlying physical relationships such as KCL and KVL. In this paper, we consider both NN-based and SVMbased approaches. A detailed description of CPAD is presented in the following sections.
A. Physics-based Features
Generally, the abundance of sensors instrumenting cyberphysical systems leads to redundancies that make it possible to cross-check sensor data for consistencies and to flag inconsistencies as data errors and possible attacks. For example, KCL states that the total current entering a bus must equal the total current leaving the bus (see Fig. 2 ). Further, current flow and voltage difference are proportionally related, with an often-unknown constant of proportionality. Similar relationships may exist among, for example, force, speed, position, pressure, and flow sensors.
Even when physical laws describing cyber-physical systems are known, challenges remain because many system constraints are difficult to know with suitable precision. For example, the built system may disagree with the design documents, components wear over time, and operational behavior may depend on outside factors like ambient temperature. Fig. 2 . Connections between sensors imply physics-based constraints, such as the current-sum relationship described by KCL. These constraints provide new ways to detect data spoofing.
Rather than use given relationships, CPAD uses powerful machine learning to automatically learn constraints that sensor data must satisfy. System sensor data is fed into a comprehensive attack generation engine to construct new sensor readings having a wide range of integrity attacks and sensor failures, such as additional noise, varying sensor bias, sensor lag, data injection, and measurement replays. The attack generation engine is described next.
B. Attack Generation Engine
Other machine learning approaches have struggled to detect attacks on power grids because they require labeled examples of the attacks they are attempting to detect, but our approach does not have that difficult requirement. Given a collection of sensor readings, it is straightforward to create spoofed sets where some readings have been replaced by replays of other readings. As a result, we can create very large, diverse, and representative data sets of both spoofed and non-spoofed data.
The attack generation engine is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Realistic data sets were constructed from simulations starting with a configuration file that provides the bus and branch parameters for the IEEE 30-bus test case shown in Fig. 1 . Then, using a probabilistic model derived from those parameters, ten thousand new configuration files are created. Specifically, the generation and load values have been randomly selected with averages equal to the nominal values. For each such file, a power flow simulation is run using the Toolkit for Hybrid System Modeling and Evaluation (THYME) package [19] and the final steady state values are extracted. THYME is an open source tool developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and it is based on discrete event simulation methodology. Steady state bus voltages, branch currents, in addition to bus real and reactive powers are extracted. Four features are selected for each bus (bus voltage magnitude, bus voltage phase angle, bus real power, and bus reactive power). Thus, a total of 120 features for the whole IEEE 30-bus system are selected. From these steady state values, a replay attack is applied one at a time to each bus (i.e., all readings for a given bus over some time interval are replaced by the corresponding readings from that bus taken from a different time interval). This resulted in ten thousand state vectors per bus (three hundred thousand for the whole 30-bus system) artificially spoofed dataset. Then, the physical features (KCL for each bus) are added (additional 30 features are added to the original 120 features which results in 150 total features). In particular, the current draws at a bus is computed Branch Bus Generator Load as (1) the net current flowing into the bus from connected buses and (2) the current required at the measured voltage to yield the measured output power. The difference between the two computed current values, which should typically be zero, is used as the new feature. The machine learning algorithms are then applied to this final dataset. Note that the final dataset consists of ten thousand clean system states and three hundred thousand spoofed system states. 
C. NN-based CPAD Mechanism
There are numerous different types of neural network paradigms that have been proposed for distinct problem domains [20] - [22] . An appropriate neural model that has been previously used for detection and general decision making has been the multi-layered feed-forward model. Multi-layered networks have continuously-valued neurons or processing elements, are trained in a supervised manner, and consist of one or more layers of nodes (called hidden layers) between the input and output nodes [20] . Input nodes are where information is presented to the network, output nodes provide the decision made by the neural network, and the hidden nodes, in essence, contain the information regarding proper mapping of inputs to decisions (outputs). The resulting feed-forward NN detection model consists of 150 input nodes (120 nodes without including the physical features) and 31 output nodes (one node for each bus in the 30-bus system and one additional node for the "no attack" case). A rectified linear unit function (or a ramp function) [23] is used for the hidden nodes, while a softmax function (or normalized exponential function) [24] , [25] is used for the output nodes as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Note that with such a NN setup, a no-hidden-layer case (only input and output layers exist) represents a logistic regression detection. In Section IV, different numbers of hidden nodes will be tested together with the no hidden layer case. Back-propagation algorithm [26] is used for model development (training) to estimate the model coefficients. It is an iterative gradient-descent algorithm designed to minimize the mean squared error between the actual output of a node and the desired output as specified in the training dataset. Weight adjustment starts at the output nodes where the error measure is readily available, and then proceeds by propagating the error measure back through the layers toward the input nodes. More detailed information regarding neural networks can be found in summary papers such as [21] , [22] .
Through the model training phase, CPAD infers the laws that govern valid sensor data, deviations from those laws indicate failures in data integrity. Through the model running phase, the CPAD detectors operate on streaming sensor measurements to immediately flag any data integrity issues, allowing operators to act before the damage is done.
D. SVM-based CPAD Mechanism
Machine learning via SVM has previously been found to exhibit improved performance and is a powerful tool for the classification of data [27] . It has been chosen as a baseline detection method in this paper because of its convenience of usage and high accuracy in classification [17] . SVM is a type of machine learning technique that attempts to successfully classify sets of data by leveraging two basic principles: largemargin separation and kernel functions. Large-margin separation refers to the idea that when classifying data it is sensible to draw a line of separation in such a manner that the distance between that line and the closest data point on either side of that line is maximized. Kernel functions are algorithms or functions that calculate the similarity between two points and must be used if nonlinear classification boundaries are required. Generally speaking, as the dimension of classification increases hyper planes are used to separate the data instead of lines. This is completed by mapping the data to a different space (also using a kernel function) where a hyper plane is able to classify the data. In order to achieve a classification based on these ideas, a convex, quadratic program must be solved [28] .
E. The Overall CPAD Mechanism
After the synthesized data attacks are generated using the attack generation engine described earlier, the classifier (either NN or SVM) is trained on these synthesized attacks in addition to the clean (no attack) data. In practice, CPAD trains directly on raw sensor data, which in many cases is already being collected. Consequently, the training phase of CPAD requires neither a specification of nor direct interaction with the hardware to learn the detection models. This makes CPAD very easy to deploy on new systems. In the operational phase, CPAD analyzes the sensor data streams to assess trust by finding violations of the learned physical constraints. These may then be incorporated into the control process and used to initiate remediation. The operational architecture of CPAD is illustrated in Fig. 5 . CPAD helps operators by identifying if, when, and where an attack or sensor failure occurs. This information augments streaming sensor data with levels of assurance, as shown in Fig. 6 . The specificity of the output means that operators can act quickly to minimize the effect of bad sensor data as well as to remediate the problem. 
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the accuracy of the proposed CPAD will be evaluated. The generated attack dataset was split for use in training the model, validating the model, and testing the model. Table 1 below illustrates the accuracy of the NN-based CPAD tested on the IEEE 30-bus power grid standard. Notice that CPAD achieved 99% accuracy on sensor replay attacks using 60-node hidden layer. It can perform 30+ times better than single-sensor models. On the other hand, the accuracy of the SVM-based CPAD tested on the same system is found to be 68%. These experiments demonstrated that the best approach was to automatically infer features from raw data (using NNbased detection) rather than to use explicitly coded physicsbased features (using SVM-based detection). Table 1 . The accuracy of CPAD tested on the IEEE 30-bus power grid standard.
Model Architecture Accuracy
Single-sensor score 3.2%
No hidden layers (logistic regression) 8%
SVM without physics-based features 45%
SVM with physics-based features 68%
Hidden 20-node layer 97%
Hidden 60-node layer 99%
V. DISCUSSION Unlike other approaches that focus on single-sensor attack detection, CPAD uses cross-sensor analytics to exploit correlations and constraints that exist between multiple sensors. This allows CPAD to detect sophisticated attacks, like those that replay valid sensor data at a later time to produce a particular effect. On a single sensor, the data look valid, so the attack only becomes detectable when viewing multi-sensors.
Another common approach focuses on anomaly detection, which identifies when the system's behavior is unusual. CPAD is not based on anomaly detection, but on non-physicality detection, which is the detection of combinations of sensor measurements that cannot correspond to physically realizable states. In highly complex systems, it is difficult to characterize the wide range of operating regimes required to create a robust anomaly detector. By exploiting physical constraints across multiple sensors, CPAD is expected to be more robust to previously unseen operating regimes.
Rather than finding physical constraints through laboratory equipment testing or by manually coding expert information about the systems' dynamics, CPAD infers the physical constraints from raw data. This leads to significantly less demand being placed on experts and enables the model to adapt more frequently. Moreover, machine learning methods require a large supply of labeled normal and attack data. Because CPAD generates its own examples from raw data, there is no need to manually code information about the 
VI. CONCLUSION
Cyber-physical false data attacks in power networks can be detected and located in real-time using machine learning classifiers. Exploiting the physics-based features of the system has improved the accuracy of detecting replay attacks. Experimental results showed that it is preferable to infer and exploit the physics using a single machine learning solution rather than to add features first and then build a detector.
Since CPAD requires neither knowledge of physical relationships nor labeled attack data, it can be applied across a wide range of cyber-physical systems to detect data integrity attacks. CPAD could potentially be used to protect industrial plants such as manufacturing, chemical processing, and nuclear facilities. Furthermore, modern aircrafts, ships, and vehicles are highly instrumented and are amenable to similar analyses.
Future work is to extend CPAD to handle higherdimensional problems, which involve looking at alternative neural network architectures and discovering how much data will be required for the algorithms to learn robust integrity attack detection. We are also interested in validating CPAD on real-world and high-dimensional data sets of power grid measurements to show that high accuracy is also available on higher dimensions.
